Islamic Law in an Islamic State: What Role for Parliament? by Nelson, Matthew J.
10
Islamic Law in an Islamic Republic
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matthew j. nelson
Created as a Muslim-majority state in August 1947, Pakistan has 
struggled with the legal institutionalization of its religious identity.
How should Pakistan, as a Muslim homeland, formalize (if at all) the 
various strains of interpretation that shape Islamic law? And, in the 
democratic state that Pakistan aspires to be, what is the role of an elected 
parliament in deﬁning the substance of that law?
Such questions often yield intense debates about the precise wording
of constitutional clauses deﬁning the state’s religious identity or the 
degree to which Islamic law should serve as “a” or “the” source of law.
But in Pakistan some of the most intense debates focused on the question
of institutional primacy with respect to interpreting that law. Questions
about who deﬁnes Islamic law, and the institutional balance between the 
interpretive authority of the parliament, the executive, and the courts,
were a key locus of debate. These debates are the focus of this chapter.
In the following sections, I trace these debates through the constitutional
texts and amendment processes (1956, 1962–63, 1973) that have char-
acterized Pakistan’s constitutional history and discuss (a) the ways in
which the preeminence of parliament in the delineation of Islamic law
took shape and (b) how this preeminence was contested.
With reference to the classical period of Islamic law, it is common to
stress a distinction between non-state muftis and state-based qazis
(Hallaq 2004: 243–258; Khadem 2005: 95–142; Alam 2007: 1255–1264).
The former, associated with madrasa-based scholars (ulema), interpreted 
Islamic law and issued opinions (fatwas) set apart from any speciﬁc
power of enforcement. Qazis, on the other hand, drew on the opinions
of prominent muftis to produce judgments coercively enforced by the
state. There was no state-based legal monopoly. Even the jurisprudence
of Sunni muftis was associated with diﬀerent “schools” of legal thought
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(Hanaﬁ, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shaﬁʿi) – each treated as a legitimate
expression of the Islamic tradition competing for adherents. Neither
jurisprudence nor state policy was seen as producing “new” law.
Instead, muftis and qazis were merely thought to “interpret” divinely
inspired norms that were, in some sense, already believed to exist.
In South Asia (and, later, in the Ottoman Middle East), the encroach-
ment of European power did not eliminate mufti-based forms of juris-
prudence or ﬁqh. European oﬃcials simply combined the work of local
muftis with imperial policy in ways that promoted the legal autonomy of
the state (Kugle 2001: 257–313). Working with “advisory” muftis after
securing control over the Mughal courts in Bengal, for instance, British
agents pressed for a more thoroughly centralized pattern of legal over-
sight: translating digests of ﬁqh in order to engage Islamic law more
directly; combining the terms of ﬁqh with European notions of “justice,
equity, and good conscience”; promulgating statutes that superseded
speciﬁc elements of ﬁqh; and, after 1861, distancing themselves from
advisory qazis altogether. The history of Muslim law is ﬁlled with pat-
terns of legal centralization in which private muftis and advisory qazis
were superseded by the power of the state. The history of Pakistan is
similar; here again the state asserted its power to deﬁne the parameters of
Islamic law.
Following in the footsteps of intellectuals like Amir Ali and
Mohammad Iqbal, some argue that Islamic law is a work in progress
fashioned by “a Muslim people” through the deliberations of their poli-
tical representatives – including their elected representatives in the case
of an Islamic “republic” (Iqbal 1934: section c. regarding ijma). Others,
however, oppose what they describe as the “arrogance” of legislative
power (Coulson 1956: 211–226). They stress the work of judicial qazis
and executive caliphs instead. The debate is familiar: Where do the terms
of Islamic law in practice come from? And, in an Islamic republic, are
Muslim legislators in a position to deﬁne the substance of Islamic law,
or not?
In Pakistan, constitutional debates have generally revolved around such
questions (Choudhury 1955: 589–600; Binder 1961; “Democracy” 1963;
Rosenthal 1965: 200–235, 250–281; “Constitutional Development” 1969;
Rahman 1970: 275–287; Khan 2001; Lau 2006). Muftis continue to issue
private fatwas (subject to voluntary compliance). But, with respect to
“enforceable” laws, the debate often revolves around speciﬁc eﬀorts to
combine prevailing forms of state centralization with parallel eﬀorts
to delineate the power of parliament. Religious traditionalists have routinely
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sought to resist the rise of parliament, insisting that Islamic law cannot be
“made” by elected Muslims. Military generals and superior court judges
have also criticized parliamentary power, hoping to undercut the power of
Pakistan’s electorate. But, in the end, I argue that each of these eﬀorts has
faltered.
Within Pakistan, questions regarding the role of parliament vis-à-vis
the speciﬁcation of what might be called “statutory shari‘a” dominate
contemporary debates regarding Islam and democracy. The preeminence
of parliament was not a foregone conclusion when Pakistan was formed
in 1947; it emerged over several years (including numerous periods of
martial law during which key features of the Constitution itself were
suspended). In fact the consolidation of parliamentary power vis-à-vis
the delineation of Islamic law remains uncertain. Still, I argue that the
speciﬁcation of a constitutional formula in which an enforceable Islamic
law was entrusted to the work of an elected Muslim legislature must be
seen as a deﬁning feature of Pakistan’s constitutional history so far.
The Cast of Characters
An appreciation for the constitutional status of Pakistan’s parliament vis-
à-vis the delineation of Islamic law requires some familiarity with three
broad sets of actors – each deﬁned by its ideas about the treatment of
Islamic law within the modern state.1
The ﬁrst pertains to “traditionalist” muftis aﬃliated with various
schools of Islamic jurisprudence or ﬁqh (see Figure 1: Group 1). This
group is composed of madrasa-based ulema bound together by a ﬁrm
commitment to the oﬃcial autonomy of their fatwas. The irony, of
course, lies in the fact that this commitment (favoring autonomy from
the “corrupting” inﬂuence of the state) is often tied to the work of
political parties like the Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam or JUI (Party of Islamic
GROUP 1
(TRADITIONALIST)
GROUP 2
(NATIONALIST)
GROUP 3
(ISLAMIST)
Autonomous muftis Autonomous state “Non-autonomous” state
Figure 1 Who Deﬁnes Islamic Law in an Islamic Republic? Three Views
1 Binder focuses on the “traditionalist” ulema (Group 1), the “modernist” politicians (with
occasional references to “secularist” soldiers and bureaucrats) (Group 2), and the “funda-
mentalist” Jama’at-e-Islami (Group 3).
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Ulema) and the Jamiat-i Ulema-i Pakistan or JUP (Party of Pakistani
Ulema) – parties that criticize the expanding reach of the very state they
seek to control.
The remaining two groups are less suspicious of the state. Viewing the
ulema as riven by doctrinal rivalries, they stress the “unifying” work of
the state while, at the same time, disagreeing about the reach of that state
with respect to its legislative power (See Figure 1: Groups 2 and 3).
Group 2 combines an appreciation for the unifying work of the state
with an appreciation for the “dynamism” of shari‘a (emphasizing the
value of “advisory” qazis working alongside a state with unfettered legis-
lative power). In Pakistan, this group includes progressive religious
ideologues like Mohammad Iqbal, who combined an appreciation for
the dynamic quality of Islam with that of an elected legislature, alongside
“nationalist” politicians like Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It also includes lay
religious actors like Ghulam Ahmad Parwez and modernist religious
philosophers like Fazlur Rahman working alongside dictators like
General Mohammad Ayub Khan. Together, these ﬁgures formed
a pragmatic religious-cum-political clique bound together by their view
that the historical evolution of Islamic law could be channelled through
the creative potential of the state (Brown 1996: 68–72, 102–107, 134–141;
Qasmi 2010: 1197–1253). Whereas nationalist ﬁgures like Jinnah and
Iqbal focused on the dynamic legislative power of an unfettered parlia-
ment, however, Parwez, Rahman, and Ayub Khan stressed the unfettered
power of the executive.
The third and ﬁnal group is less convinced that Islamic law lends itself
to a dynamic process of “legislation.” In fact this group views the power of
the state through lenses crafted by a famous Islamist ideologue named
Abu’l ala Maududi, stressing the unifying power of a shari‘a-focused state
with very little legislative autonomy. Here, Islamic law is not generalized
as mere “principles” guiding an otherwise unfettered legislature (Group
2). Nor is it buried beneath scholarly and sectarian debates (Group 1).
On the contrary, Group 3 insists that, far from deﬁning shari‘a, the state
merely enforces it as a set of historically inﬂexible provisions. Legislation
is, thus, for Group 3, broadly seen as anathema even as state-based
enforcement is generally seen as indispensible.2
2 For a discussion of Maududi’s views regarding “legislation” (in light of the prophetic
example and the wisdom of the ulema) – developed in contrast to the views of those Binder
describes as Pakistan’s “ijma modernists” (e.g. Ghulam Ahmad Parwez) – see Brown
(1996: 74–80, 112, 126–128); Binder (1961: 90–104).
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Since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the traditionalists and the
Islamists in Groups 1 and 3 have teamed up to oppose the “unfet-
tered” legislative power articulated by the nationalists in Group 2.
The most energetic battles, however, have often unfolded within
Group 2. Scholars like Charles Kennedy and Martin Lau, for instance,
note that, in the ongoing tussle between Pakistan’s executive (includ-
ing the army) and its parliament, appeals to the judiciary became so
common that, ultimately, it was neither the executive nor parliament
but the judiciary that actually reigned supreme. Moving away from
any speciﬁc interest in ideology, in other words, Kennedy and Lau
stress the role of institutions (and, especially, the role of institutional
frictions) in deﬁning Pakistan’s constitutional relationship with Islam
(Kennedy 1992: 769–787; Lau 2006). Whereas Kennedy and Lau
arrive at an appreciation for the autonomous power of the judiciary,
however, I maintain that it was not the judiciary but parliament (with
its traditionalist, nationalist, and Islamist political parties) that
emerged as constitutionally supreme.
What follows is an eﬀort to recount this emerging supremacy of
parliament in three parts. The ﬁrst begins with the independence of
Pakistan in 1947 and ends with the promulgation of Pakistan’s ﬁrst
Constitution in 1956; the second ends with the promulgation of
Pakistan’s second Constitution in 1962; the third ends with the
Constitution of 1973. Typically, 1973 is regarded as the pinnacle of
Pakistan’s twentieth-century constitutional history. But, with respect
to Islamic law and the parameters of Pakistan’s Islamic state, I argue
that the Constitution of 1956 (as reﬂected in the Constitution of
1962 and, especially, its amendment in 1963) is actually more
important. Before 1963 Pakistani traditionalists, nationalists, and
Islamists battled one another to determine who would deﬁne the
terms of Islamic law; after 1963 this debate was clariﬁed in ways that
favored an unfettered state dominated by Pakistani nationalists.
Subsequent reﬁnements were vigorously contested; but, after 1963,
the institutional conﬁguration that deﬁned Pakistan’s approach to
Islamic law was stable. The irony lay in the fact that this conﬁgura-
tion, stressing the power of parliament, took shape in a Constitution
promulgated by a military dictator. A deeper understanding of this
outcome requires an appreciation, not only for the debates that
shaped each of Pakistan’s three Constitutions (1956, 1962–63,
1973) but also for the debates that preceded and followed each
document.
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“Constitutionalizing” Islamic Law (1947–62)
Constitutional Debates (1947–52)
After the independence of Pakistan in 1947, the members of Pakistan’s
Constituent Assembly – more than 70 percent of whom belonged to the
(nationalist) Pakistan Muslim League led by Governor-General
Mohammad Ali Jinnah – were indirectly elected. They were indirectly
elected, following the colonial election of 1946, by Provincial Assemblies
in East Bengal and, more than 1,000 miles away, in Sindh, West Punjab,
Balochistan, and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province.3
Building on the work of a group known as the Pakistan Educational
Conference, chaired by Fazlur Rahman of East Bengal (which, in late 1947,
endorsed an “Ideology of Pakistan” devoted to the inculcation of Islamic
values in a push to counter the threat of “provincialism” in Pakistan’s
public schools), the Constituent Assembly began with a landmark resolu-
tion known as the Objectives Resolution in March 1949 (Conrad 1997:
122–151). This resolution set Pakistani constitutionalism (and Muslim
nationalism) apart from the secular language adopted by India while, at
the same time, seeking to stress “the cohesive potential of Islam”:
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God almighty
alone, and [whereas] the authority which He has delegated to the state of
Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits pre-
scribed by Him is a sacred trust, . . . this Constituent Assembly, represent-
ing the people of Pakistan, resolves to frame a Constitution for the
sovereign independent state of Pakistan; wherein the state shall exercise
its power and authority through the chosen representatives of the
people; . . . [and wherein] Muslims shall be enabled to order their
lives . . . in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as
set out in the Qur’an and the sunnah . . . etc.
Approved by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, who migrated to
Pakistan from East Punjab after the Partition of India, as well as Governor-
General Khwaja Nazimuddin from East Bengal, who succeeded Jinnah
after his death in September 1948, this resolution sought to balance the
3 In 1947, India’s Constituent Assembly was divided in two, with each Assembly serving,
simultaneously, as an interim national legislature. (Delegates from Bengal and Punjab
were also divided between their “Indian” and “Pakistani” constituencies.) In Pakistan, after
several adjustments to accommodate representatives for Muslim refugees from India and
various princely states, East Bengal held 44 seats, Punjab 17 (plus 5 for refugees), Sindh 4
(plus 1 for refugees), Balochistan 1, NWFP 3, and the princely states / tribal areas 4
(Callard 1957: 78–85; Binder 1961: 121–123).
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sovereignty of God (in keeping with the rhetorical position adopted by
many Islamists) with the sovereignty of the postcolonial state (in keeping
with the terms of South Asian Muslim nationalism). At the same time,
however, it went out of its way to avoid any reference to Sunni ﬁqh –
clearly marginalizing the (traditionalist) ulema. The state-oriented views of
Groups 2 and 3, in other words, were recognized at the expense of those
commonly associated with Group 1.4
The Constituent Assembly went on to establish a 25-member Basic
Principles Committee (BPC), dominated by members of the Muslim
League, as well as (a) various subcommittees to address the federal
distribution of power and (b) a special panel of religious experts known
as the Talimat-e-Islamia Board (the “Teachings of Islam” Board) to
examine the constitutional status of Islamic law.5
Unfortunately, the ﬁrst report of this BPC (1950), known as its “interim”
report, failed to satisfy two core constituencies, namely (a) the tradition-
alist ulema and (b) the residents of East Bengal.6 First, the report noted that
the Objectives Resolution, highlighting the sovereignty of “God almighty”
and “the limits prescribed by Him,” should be incorporated within the
Constitution as a nonbinding “directive principle of state policy” (subordi-
nated to binding commitments like the enforcement of fundamental
rights). Second, the BPC recommended Urdu as the national language as
well as an upper house in which each province would enjoy equal repre-
sentation (ignoring the fact that Pakistan’s demographic majority lived in
Bengali-speaking East Bengal). The ensuing dissent was so vigorous –
particularly in East Bengal – that the Constituent Assembly was adjourned
to revise its interim report (Binder 1961: 200–207).
Intervening Debates (1947–52)
Responding to the ﬁrst BPC report, which had rejected the views of the
Talimat-e-Islamia Board, 31 religious scholars – both traditionalists
4 Hindu members, expressing concerns about the special status of Islam in the Objectives
Resolution, recommended several amendments, but in the end these were rejected along
communal lines.
5 The ﬁnal membership of the BPC diﬀered from its original membership. The sole Ahmadi
member resigned, leaving 24 who signed the ﬁnal report: three were Hindus and ﬁve were
brought in at various points to replace four who died and one – the chief minister of
Sindh –who was replaced by an oﬃcial from the Sindh High Court after his party fell short
in the provincial election of 1953.
6 For the composition of the Talimat-e-Islamia Board, as well as the BPC’s rejection of its
views, see Binder (1961: 156–158, 166–177, 180–181).
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(Group 1) and Islamists (Group 3) –met in Karachi (1951) to re-articulate
their demands.7 This meeting included Abu’l ala Maududi and at least four
members of the Talimat-e-Islamia Board itself, all of whom noted that, as
a Muslim homeland, Pakistan should be tied to a clear Islamic ideology.
Stressing 22keypoints, for instance, they insisted that Pakistan’s headof state
should be a pious male Muslim advised by a Legislative Council regarding
matters not already “settled” by the terms of shari‘a and, above all, that
a special committee of religious experts should be created to ensure that any
lawpassedby theLegislativeCouncilwouldnot contravene theQur’anor the
sunna as interpreted by the jurisprudential “schools” prevailing amongst
the ulema (Binder 1961: 215–219; Rosenthal 1965: 215, 222–223). In fact,
claiming pride of place with reference to the delineation and speciﬁcation of
Pakistan’s “Muslim” identity, the traditionalists went on to insist that the role
of the ulema should be enhanced via “provision[s] for Islamic education in
accordance with . . . the various . . . schools of . . . [traditionalist] thought” as
well as “the administration of [Muslim law] by judges . . . belonging to
th[ose] . . . schools” (Maududi 1955 [1969]: 321–322).
Constitutional Debates (Revisited)
In 1952, the BPC reconvened to draft a “revised” report addressing these
traditionalist/Islamist suggestions (Callard 1957: 94–96). Led by Khwaja
Nazimuddin – who resigned as Pakistan’s governor-general to become
Pakistan’s prime minister following the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan
in 1951 – this second report noted that the head of state must be a Muslim
while, at the same time, continuing to embrace the Objectives Resolution as
a nonbinding constitutional preamble. It also added greater speciﬁcity to the
overall allocation of parliamentary seats, noting that Pakistan’s eastern and
western wings should enjoy exactly equal numbers (Binder 1961: 245–247).8
Intervening Debates (Revisited)
Again, the pattern of dissent was twofold. While appreciating the prin-
ciple that Pakistan’s parliamentary seats should be divided equally
7 For an account of earlier initiatives, including a 1948 proposal from Constituent Assembly
member Maulana Shibbir Ahmad Usmani (JUI) for a Ministry of Religious Aﬀairs to
oversee the work of the government (without any formal accountability to the legislature),
see Binder (1961: 33, 98).
8 For additional proposals (e.g. equal numbers for East andWest Pakistan in the lower house
and equal numbers for each province in the upper house), see Binder (1961: 311–312).
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between its eastern and western wings (notwithstanding East Pakistan’s
overall majority), western provinces like the Punjab opposed the distri-
bution of seats within West Pakistan itself. And, somewhat predictably,
the “religious” lobby representing Groups 1 and 3 insisted that their
advice regarding the “Islamic” status of state-based laws should be
binding.
Prime Minister Nazimuddin responded to the concerns articulated by
Groups 1 and 3 with a proposal stating that the head of state should
constitute an “advisory” board of ulema to rule on the repugnancy of
individual laws (with the unanimous vote of this board forcing impugned
laws back to the legislature for amendment) (Binder 1961: 230–232, 257,
270, 274–276).9 But, eventually, the Constituent Assembly decided to reject
this idea, turning instead to a proposal in which declarations of repug-
nancy were left with the Supreme Court alone (Choudhury 1955: 591).10
A Constitution Deferred (I): Traditionalists and Islamists
versus Nationalists (1952–56)
The frustration of traditionalist and Islamist religious scholars, having
been denied any exclusive or binding authority over the Islamization of
existing laws, was partially oﬀset by the long-term prospect of installing
like-minded allies within the country’s highest court. Still, they resented
ongoing eﬀorts to promote the notion of institutional power-sharing vis-
à-vis the issue of “repugnancy.” In eﬀect, they saw this push for the
separation of powers as a deliberate eﬀort to diminish their assumed
supremacy in matters of religious identity. And, beginning in 1952,
extralegal methods were used to assert the strength of their collective
demands.
In comments prepared for the second BPC meeting in 1952, Islamist
ideologue Abu’l ala Maududi argued that a religious group known as the
Ahmadiyya should be relegated to a separate “non-Muslim” electorate
9 Note that, in Pakistan, the role of religious experts was “advisory,” whereas in Israel these
experts succeeded in preserving various forms of exclusive jurisdiction (see Hanna
Lerner’s chapter in this book).
10 For additional proposals regarding the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, see Rosenthal
(1965: 208, 214–215, 220); Binder (1961: 104–108, 238, 265–266, 319, 324–325). For
Group 1 views favoring an “advisory” Board of Ulema (or selected ulema on the Supreme
Court itself), see Binder (1961: 223–224, 280–281, 289–291, 326–327, 358). Note that
scholars like Mohammad Asad had long stressed a signiﬁcant role for the Supreme Court
in adjudicating matters of repugnancy; Maududi simply hoped to see a Court dominated
by Islamist judges (Binder 1961: 336).
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(Binder 1961: 272, 286). (The Ahmadiyya were regarded by many
Muslims as heretics owing to their description of a late nineteenth-
century spiritual leader named Mirza Ghulam Ahmed as a “prophet.”
This description was said to reject the notion that Mohammad was the
last and ﬁnal prophet of Islam.) In fact, shortly after Maududi argued that
the Ahmadiyya should be assigned to a separate electorate, he joined
a small number of traditionalist parties like the JUI in a series of protests
that rapidly spilled out onto the streets.11
Pakistan’s governor-general Ghulam Mohammad (who took over as
governor-general when Khwaja Nazimuddin became prime minister in
1951) was appalled by this turn to rioting as a form of political pressure –
a form of pressure seeking to rally public support behind the constitu-
tional demands of those claiming to “defend” Islam. The army was
eventually called in to restore order. But, just a few weeks later, Prime
Minister Nazimuddin intervened to remove the chief minister of the
Punjab for failing to prevent the riots. This was a controversial move.
In fact, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad stepped in shortly
thereafter to dismiss Nazimuddin for ousting Punjab’s chief minister.
According to Ghulam Mohammad, this was an act that only he was
legally entitled to perform.
Constitutionally, the riots of 1952–53 were pivotal. First and foremost,
they prompted a brief period of martial law, raising numerous questions
about the relative powers of parliament (Prime Minister Nazimuddin)
and the executive (Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad). Even more
importantly, however, with reference to Pakistan’s religious identity, they
prompted an oﬃcial inquiry that culminated in a famous report authored
by the chief justice of the Lahore High Court, MohammadMunir, and his
colleague, Malik Rustom Kayani (Qasmi 2014). This report, commonly
known as the Munir Report, argued that, whether or not parliament was
supreme, the state should always avoid declaring who was (and who was
not) aMuslim. “It does not require much imagination,”Munir explained,
“to judge the consequences” of a fratricidal process in which each group
seeking to control the religious identity of the country sought to deﬁne
every other group as “apostates” (subject to death) (“Report of the Court”
1954: 219). In fact pushing back against Groups 1 and 3, Munir insisted
11 Maududi and the JUI were late arrivals in the anti-Ahmadiyya “direct action” of 1952–53.
This mobilization was initiated by a group of religious activists known as the Ahrar; it
accelerated after an All-Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention was held in Karachi
in January 1953. (For the link between these riots and Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly,
see Binder (1961: 259–272, 281–296.)
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that any state-based enforcement of a zero-sum religious identity was
categorically incompatible with public order. The terms of Islam, he noted,
must be deﬁned, neither by the totalitarian views of Maududi nor by rival
ulema, but rather by an unfettered (national) state committed to ongoing
legislation within the constitutional parameters of what might be
described as “intra-Muslim nonestablishment.”
Munir was not convinced that the power of the state should be
dominated by parliament (particularly insofar as Pakistan’s elected repre-
sentatives had revealed their vulnerability to the power of religious
populism). In fact, within Group 2, Munir’s own loyalties did not lay
with a “nationalist” parliament; they lay with the consolidation of
a powerful executive.
A Constitution Deferred (II): Executive versus
Parliamentary Primacy (1952–56)
Munir’s critique of the religious traditionalists and Islamists in Groups 1
and 3 clearly inﬂuenced the work of Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly,
where, in the wake of the anti-Ahmadiyya riots that engulfed the Punjab
in 1952–53, state-based attempts to enforce a static expression of Islamic
law – as deﬁned by the ulema or Maududi – were rejected (Collins 1988:
511–584, 552). In fact the intensity of the intra-Muslim competition
unfolding both within Group 1 and between Groups 1 and 3 was routi-
nely cited to overrule any agreement those groups might have stressed
regarding the allocation of the Ahmadiyya to a separate electorate.
Amongst the nationalists within Group 2, however, an overarching
constitutional consensus regarding the distribution of power between the
executive, the judiciary, and the legislature proved elusive. Some insisted
that eﬀorts to delineate the terms of Islamic law should remain in the
hands of the legislature: “[I]n many respects the mutable part of the
[shari‘a] requires considerable overhauling, and the immutable bases
(e.g. the Qur’an) need a new interpretation,” wrote Education Minister
I.H. Qureshi (echoing the views of Mohammad Iqbal), asking: “Who will
do this work of . . . interpretation?” “It is obvious,” he noted, “that the
only place where [such a] discussion can take place is the legislature,
because, as the supreme representative of the people, the legislature alone
can . . . [determine] what seems rational and proper” (Binder 1961: 191;
Rosenthal 1965: 236; Choudhury 1969: 51).
Others, however, doubted the extent to which autonomous legislators
could rise above populist forms of bigotry. “[W]e are prompted by
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something they call human conscience,” Justice Munir explained, to ask
“whether . . . the problem of law and order [should] not be divorced from
[that] democratic bed-fellow called ministerial government which is so
remorselessly haunted by . . . political nightmares” (“Report of the Court”
1954: 387; Lombardi 2010: 660).12 Clearly, Munir maintained, the insti-
tutionalization of Islamic law should not be left to the legislature.
As a question of law and order, he argued, its natural home was the
executive.
In the end, however, fearing the possibility of an ever-expanding
executive, the Constituent Assembly sided with I.H. Qureshi, noting
that any law deemed “repugnant” to the terms of Islam (by the
Supreme Court) should be referred back to the legislature for amend-
ment – although, having said this, the assembly went on to ask whether
this arrangement could be put into practice if, owing to the martial law
regime imposed during the riots of 1953, the Constituent Assembly was
still, technically speaking, suspended. Indeed, even as Justice Munir and
Justice Kayani were drafting their response to the riots in Lahore, the
Constituent Assembly was drafting several amendments designed to rein
in Pakistan’s executive.13 In particular, recalling the governor-general’s
dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin, the assembly sought to intro-
duce a special amendment preventing the executive from dissolving the
legislature – full stop (Choudhury 1963: 48).
These amendments were introduced for debate in September 1954.
But, less than a month later, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad
dissolved the Constituent Assembly – a move quickly challenged by the
president of the assembly in a famous case known as Tamizuddin Khan
v. Federation of Pakistan (1955). Initially, the courts rejected the gover-
nor-general’s position that the Constituent Assembly’s amendments
seeking to restrict his powers were not “law” because they had not yet
received his consent. But, in March 1955, the Federal Court led by
Mohammad Munir (recently elevated to the post of Chief Justice)
accepted the governor-general’s arguments. Of course the implications
of this decision were far-reaching, throwing several laws already enacted
by the assembly without the governor-general’s consent (because the
12 Munir’s deputy, Justice M.R. Kayani, opposed military authoritarianism.
13 For an account of the political circumstances surrounding these amendments, with
particular reference to the politics of East Bengal – including Muslim League eﬀorts to
battle new forms of cooperation between (a) dissident Bengali politicians (who, as a newly
formed United Front, prevailed in Bengal’s 1954 provincial elections) and (b) religious
leaders aﬃliated with Groups 1 and 3 – see Binder (1961: 352–359).
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assembly believed it was “sovereign”) into question (Callard 1957: 86).
But Munir did not fail to see the constitutional crisis he had been
unleashed. In fact, within a few months, he issued a countervailing
opinion declaring that it was, actually, the assembly – as opposed to the
governor-general acting in a state of emergency – through which any
constitutional provision must be drafted (Usif Patel v. The Crown 1955).
Shortly after this countervailing opinion was issued, 40 members from
each “half” of Pakistan – distributed amongst the parties that had parti-
cipated in provincial elections after 1946 (e.g. Punjab 1951, Bengal 1954,
and so on) – came together as Pakistan’s Second Constituent Assembly.
This second assembly was charged with promulgating the country’s ﬁrst
Constitution.14
Pakistan’s First Constitution: A False Start (1956)
Ratiﬁed in March 1956, Pakistan’s ﬁrst Constitution was notable for its
emphasis on parliamentary primacy: a unicameral parliament consisting
of 310 members equally divided between East and West Pakistan.15
The name of the country became The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and
the Objectives Resolution (1949) was incorporated as a nonbinding con-
stitutional preamble. More detailed religious provisions, including com-
pulsory teaching of the Qur’an for Muslims, were set forth in a series of
nonjusticiable articles known as the “Directive Principles of State Policy.”
And, ﬁnally, the crucial issue of “repugnancy” was taken up in Articles
197–198, where it was noted that, while the president was expected to
appoint both (a) an organization devoted to Islamic research and (b) an
“advisory” commission charged with making recommendations for the
Islamization of existing laws (while protecting the Constitution and the
sectarian diversity within “Muslim personal law” from the speciﬁc
encroachments of this process), any ﬁnal decision regarding the correc-
tion of ostensibly “repugnant” laws would be made, not by the Supreme
Court, but rather by the National Assembly (Binder 1961: 371–374;
Choudhury 1963: 183, 185; Wheeler 1970: 99).
In practice, however, the president delayed any appointments to the
advisory commission spelled out in Articles 197 and 198 for nearly two
years. Throughout this period, the country was preoccupied with the
14 For an account of the events that preceded the formation of the Second Constituent
Assembly, particularly in East Bengal, see Qasmi (2014); Binder (1961: 367–369); Callard
(1957: 31, 118–123).
15 For Maududi’s response to the 1956 Constitution, see Maududi (1955 [1969]: 355–377).
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political instability ﬂowing from a rapid succession of prime ministers:
Chaudhury Mohammad Ali (1955–56), Hussain Shaheed Suhrwawardy
(1956–57), Ibrahim Ismail Chundrigar (October–December 1957), and
Feroz Khan Noon (1957–58). Within three years Pakistan’s new
Constitution had been abrogated. In October 1958, President Iskander
Mirza dismissed Pakistan’s National Assembly and declared martial law
before, just three weeks later, being sent into exile by his own chief
martial law administrator, Mohammad Ayub Khan. Pakistan’s ﬁrst
Constitution favored a powerful parliament. But, throughout the mid-
1950s, real power lay with Pakistan’s executive.
Islamic Constitutionalism (1962–63)
The military coup led by Chief Martial Law Administrator General
Mohammad Ayub Khan was endorsed (not surprisingly) by Chief
Justice Mohammad Munir (The State v. Dosso 1958).16 Even before
Ayub turned his attention to the preparation of a new Constitution,
however, he stepped forward to outline a number of “Islamic” legal
reforms by way of executive ordinance – reforms that set the stage for
some of the most important religious provisions to emerge, four years
later, in Pakistan’s second Constitution (1962).
The most signiﬁcant reform was known as the Muslim Family Laws
Ordinance (MFLO 1961). This ordinance sought to institutionalize a set
of (quite “unfettered”) proposals recommended by an earlier commission
known as the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws (1955), includ-
ing provisions regarding (a) marriage (requiring state-based registration,
permission for polygamous marriages, and a higher minimum age), (b)
divorce (outlawing “triple talaq” and requiring state-based registration
for divorce), and (c) inheritance (allowing orphaned grandchildren to
inherit in place of their parents) (Coulson 1963: 240–257; Esposito 1982;
Collins 1988: 559). In fact the commission placed the authority to deﬁne
the terms of shari‘a ﬁrmly within the parameters of the modern national
state, going out of its way to marginalize traditional muftis and reject the
inﬂexible understanding of shari‘a embraced by most Islamists (“Report
of the Commission” 1963).17 Above all, the new Constitution promul-
gated by Ayub in 1962 – originating in the work of an 11-member
16 Justice Cornelius dissented, stressing the indispensability of “fundamental rights” even in
the wake of a successful coup.
17 The ﬁrst version of this report was published in 1956.
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Constitution Commission appointed by Ayub in 1960 before being sub-
stantially revised (in secret) by Ayub’s hand-picked cabinet – went out of
its way to ensure that Ayub’s MFLO was carefully shielded from
scrutiny.18 In particular, Ayub ensured that his MFLO was protected
from judicial review.
Constitutional Debates
Together with the MFLO (which many traditionalists and Islamists saw
as the epitome of “nationalist” legislative arrogance), Ayub’s new
Constitution deﬁned a fresh high-water mark for the unfettered law-
making autonomy generally associated with Group 2 (Collins 1988: 557,
560–562; Qasmi 2010: 1229–1235).19 But, in many ways, its most ambi-
tious institutional reforms were also short-lived; in fact it is not the
Constitution of 1962 so much as the Constitution of 1962 as amended
in 1963 (reinstating certain elements from the Constitution of 1956) that
deﬁned the relationship between Islamic law and the parameters of the
postcolonial state.
Ayub’s Constitution began by changing the name of the country to
“The Islamic Republic of Pakistan” (removing the word “Islamic”) and
retaining the Objectives Resolution as a nonbinding preamble carefully
revised to remove religious constraints as follows: “Whereas sovereignty
over the entire universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone and the authority
to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by
Him is a sacred trust, . . . this Constituent Assembly . . . resolves [. . .].”
In fact Ayub went on to ensure that Pakistan’s Directive Principles of
State Policy were diluted to relax the possibility of constraints imposed by
the ulema, noting that “the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled . . . to
18 K.J. Newman notes that the members of Ayub’s Constitution Commission were “not
impressive in caliber,” describing them as mostly “lawyers and businessmen of medium
standing” (Newman 1962: 360). The Constitution Commission was directly under Ayub’s
control, but it was not entirely insensitive to public views. In place of an elected assembly
it engaged the public through elite interviews and more than 6,000 replies to an elaborate
questionnaire. Traditionalists and Islamists led by Maududi responded by reiterating the
22 demands they articulated in 1951; nationalists aﬃliated with G.A. Parwez responded as
well. In the end, however, the views of the commission (particularly with respect to
limitations on executive power) were largely ignored by Ayub’s cabinet (Newman 1962:
361–362; Choudhury 1963: 144; Rosenthal 1965: 251–254).
19 In 1959 Ayub Khan promulgated the West Pakistan Auqaf Properties Ordinance to
manage the endowments that supported so much of Pakistan’s (previously autonomous)
religious infrastructure: madrasas, shrines, and so on. The ulema knew they were under
attack.
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order their lives in accordance with [the teachings and requirements of
Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an and sunna] the fundamental principles
and basic concepts of Islam.” And, in Article 198, Ayub removed similar
constraints to stress that, with respect to future legislation, “no law shall
be passed which will be repugnant to the teaching and requirements of
Islam” (Choudhury 1963: 177–189). Together, these adjustments were
intended to stress that, under Ayub, Islamization and the removal of
“repugnancy” could only proceed if the diﬀerent schools of traditionalist
thought managed to accomplish the almost impossible task of “evolv[ing]
unanimity” with respect to “the fundamentals of Islam” (Lau 2006: 7).
Naturally, all of these adjustments were ﬁercely opposed by Groups 1
and 3. In fact within a year each was reversed as a consequence of their
opposition. In particular, Article 198 was amended to ensure that, in the
course of state-based eﬀorts to ensure that no law was repugnant to Islam
“as set out in the Holy Qur’an and sunna,” the expression “Qur’an
and sunna” was taken to mean “the Qur’an and sunna as interpreted by
each sect.”20
In the amended Constitution of 1963, Article 6 continued to stress
that, as per the Constitution of 1956, oﬃcial decisions regarding repug-
nancy (and its correction) would be made, not by the Supreme Court, but
rather by the National Assembly: “Our courts are not conversant with . . .
religious knowledge, [so] . . . it would be a great mistake to leave this
matter to the courts,” noted Law Minister Khurshid Ahmed (Tanzil-ur-
Rahman 1996: 47). In fact, returning to the views of the Pakistan
Education Conference (1947), Ahmed argued that the best option was
to proceed by way of education, so that “by education . . . we create such
[a] public opinion that we [are able to] Islamize our laws” via parliament.
Even as it provided for a set of institutions to support the Islamization
of existing laws, then (drawing attention to the nonbinding advice of
Pakistan’s Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology in Article 199), the
Constitution of 1962–63 simply reiterated elements ﬁrst articulated in
1956 to prevent the courts from correcting instances of repugnancy on
20 This attention to the views of each sect was articulated by Group 1 traditionalists as early
as 1951 (Binder 1961: 220, 283–284, 371; Rosenthal 1965: 219, 222). Fazlur Rahman
stressed conﬂicting trends in the 1962 Constitution (as amended in 1963), namely (a) the
perpetuation of “all existing ﬁqh schools” (Group 1) and (b) principles of policy stressing
“unity” and “observance of Islamic moral standards” (Group 3). It was a relief, Rahman
noted, revealing his preference for Group 2, that “despite the recognition of ﬁqh-
schools . . . the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance – a great stroke of reformist legislation –
was enforced in 1961” (Rahman 1970: 286–287).
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their own. Indeed, even as the superior courts were empowered to review
laws that cut against speciﬁc fundamental rights, they were not unilat-
erally empowered to revise any law suspected of questionable ties to
“Islam.” This was partially a consequence of Article 6 (regarding the
primacy of parliament vis-à-vis Pakistan’s “principles of law-making”),
but in many ways, it was also the result of a rather unusual Fourth
Schedule (which stated that certain laws, including laws like the MFLO
that fell under the heading “Muslim personal law,” would not be open to
judicial review).21 In fact, together with Article 6, this Fourth Schedule
stepped in to ensure that, precisely insofar as Ayub Khan’s Muslim
Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) sought to revisit (and revise) the para-
meters of “Muslim personal law,” it was protected from any articulation
of judicial review that might seek to challenge its “unfettered” (national-
ist) power.22 Legislation pertaining to Muslim personal law, in other
words, like the Constitution itself, was protected from judicial review,
even as judicial eﬀorts touching on other legal matters were restricted to
an explication of what was not “Islamic” (rather than what actually was).
The task of deﬁning what was Islamic, in a positive statutory sense, was
carefully reserved for parliament.
Islamic Constitutionalism “Under Review” (1963–2000)
Naturally, Islamists like Maududi were appalled by the protections
articulated within Ayub Khan’s Fourth Schedule. In fact Maududi’s ire
was so pronounced that, by 1965, he abandoned his own insistence that
the head of state must be a pious Muslim male to support the sister of
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Fatima Jinnah, in that year’s presidential elec-
tion. Fatima Jinnah failed to unseat Ayub, but Maududi’s opposition to
Ayub’s religious-cum-legal tinkering carried on. In fact by 1968 his
protests had reached such a pitch that one of Pakistan’s most inﬂuential
nationalist philosophers, Fazlur Rahman, was forced to resign as chair of
Pakistan’s constitutionally mandated Central Institute of Islamic
Research (Article 207).
21 For the circumstances surrounding the formulation of this Fourth Schedule, see
Choudhury (1963: 264–268).
22 When the MFLO was challenged for the ﬁrst time in the Supreme Court, the Court
declared that, according to constitutional provisions protecting the terms of Muslim
personal law from charges of “repugnancy,” it was not in a position to intervene (Syed Ali
Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt. Col. Muhammad Yousaf 1963).
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Throughout the late 1960s protests were brewing both on the right
(Maududi) and the left (owing to burgeoning inequality between the
country’s eastern and western wings). And, inMarch 1969, Ayub chose to
step down, nominating his colleague, General Yahya Khan, to take his
place as president (in contravention of Ayub’s own constitutional prin-
ciple [Article 16] stating that the Speaker of the National Assembly
should ﬁll any vacancy in the presidency). Yahya quickly imposedmartial
law and called for national elections (1970). But, when Ayub’s turncoat
foreign minister, Zulﬁqar Ali Bhutto (leading a newly formed party
known as the Pakistan People’s Party), refused to accept what many
saw as the free and fair election of his rival, Mujibur Rahman (represent-
ing a party based in East Pakistan known as the Awami League), the
country collapsed into civil war. India intervened, and in due course East
Pakistan was reconstituted as an independent state – the state of
Bangladesh.
Intervening Debates
Reﬂecting on this tumultuous sequence of events following the transfer
of power from General Ayub to General Yahya in Asma Jilani
v. Government of the Punjab, the Pakistan Supreme Court once again
sought to shore up the power of parliament. Describing Yahya as
a “usurper,” Chief Justice Hamoodur Rahman drew on the
Objectives Resolution to articulate “[a] principle of sovereignty based
on the idea of trusteeship in which the body politic [i.e. the ‘people’
acting through their chosen ‘representatives’]” was treated as the only
legitimate trustee “for the discharge of sovereign functions.”23 In fact
Justice Rahman sought to challenge both the authoritarianism of the
military and the authoritarianism of Islamists like Maududi, suggest-
ing that, in a parliamentary democracy, “[political] trusteeship must
consist of a plurality of persons, which ‘negates the possibility of
absolute power being vested in a single hand’” (Lau 2000: 53 [citing
Asma Jilani]).
Zulﬁqar Ali Bhutto succeeded General Yahya as Pakistan’s chief mar-
tial law administrator after the elections of 1970. And, when martial law
was lifted in April 1972 (after the formation of Bangladesh), he was
23 Justice Afzal Zullah went further, describing the Objectives Resolution as a “supra-
constitutional” provision. But, in the end, the Court did not endorse his view (Lau
2000: 55).
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installed as the new prime minister. Shortly thereafter, Bhutto reconsti-
tuted his rump National Assembly as Pakistan’s fourth Constituent
Assembly (there were no fresh elections after the separation of East
Pakistan and the termination of martial law) to rewrite the country’s
constitution.24
Constitutional Debates
Building on the Constitution of 1962–63, Bhutto preserved almost all of
the existing articles concerning the Islamization of law (even redeﬁning
Ayub’s Fourth Schedule as a new “First” Schedule to protect Muslim
personal law from the burden of judicial review). In fact with respect to
the elaboration of an “Islamic” constitution the dictatorship of Ayub and
the democracy of Bhutto scarcely diﬀered (even to the point of introdu-
cing broadly “secular” provisions initially and, then, following violent
protests by Groups 1 and 3, backtracking via “religious” amendments the
following year).
At the same time, the Supreme Court issued a landmark judgment
reinforcing (once again) the primacy of parliament in matters pertaining
to Islam. In The State v. Ziaur Rahman (1973), the Court reiterated that,
when it came to the delineation of Islamic law, the role of the judiciary
was limited to deﬁning what was not Islamic and not to deﬁning what
was. In eﬀect, the Court held that the state’s role in deﬁning Islamic law in
a “positive” sense was strictly conﬁned to parliament; neither the (non-
binding) Objectives Resolution nor the judiciary occupied anything like
an overarching supra-constitutional power.25
Intervening Debates
The Constitution of 1973 changed the name of Pakistan’s “Advisory”
Council of Islamic Ideology to, simply, the Council of Islamic Ideology or
CII (Article 228), noting (once again) that any law found to be repugnant
by this CII would be referred back to the legislature for amendment
24 Before the elections of 1970, General Yahya announced that Pakistan’s National
Assembly would include 313 members – 169 from East Pakistan and 144 from West
Pakistan. Pakistan’s fourth Constituent Assembly was composed of the 144 members
elected from Pakistan’s (revived) western provinces (Wheeler 1970: xiii).
25 “In eﬀect,” Lau writes, “the Supreme Court voluntarily limited its power. It would not
interfere with . . . parliament’s power to make laws or amend the constitution” (Lau
2006: 19).
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(Article 230).26 The Objectives Resolution, in turn, was retained as
a nonbinding preamble, with Article 2 identifying Islam as Pakistan’s
state religion (and, in Article 41, the religion of the president, with both
the president and the prime minister being expected to swear an oath
that Mohammad was the ﬁnal prophet of God – in other words, an oath
rejecting the views of the Ahmadiyya).27 In fact, following on from this,
a Second Constitutional Amendment was forged in 1974 to redeﬁne the
Ahmadiyya as, legally speaking, “non-Muslims.”28
Both the Constitution of 1973 and this Second Amendment were
adopted unanimously. But, again, massive political disagreements con-
tinued to fester just below the surface; in fact, within just a few years,
Bhutto’s opponents came together in a uniﬁed show of resistance after
Bhutto scheduled fresh elections (1977). Unfortunately, the elections
were rigged (in favor of Bhutto). And, as protests spread, the chief of
the army staﬀ, General Zia-ul-Haq, stepped in to impose martial law once
again.
Zia’s coup was endorsed by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court
in the case ofBegumNusrat Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (1977) – a case
that directly challenged the principle of “popular” sovereignty outlined in
Asma Jilani (1972). Zia, however, did not entirely disagree with Asma
Jilani’s reading of Pakistan’s Objectives Resolution and its speciﬁc refer-
ences to sovereignty. He merely returned to the Objectives Resolution to
reshape, with reference to “Islam,” the issue of judicial review.
Reviving “Islamization”: Executive and Judicial Powers
In 1979 General Zia promulgated a remarkable constitutional amend-
ment that, for the ﬁrst time, empowered provincial high courts to judge
whether or not a given law was “repugnant” to the terms of Islam on their
own. Modifying earlier eﬀorts to endow the Supreme Court and the
National Assembly with such powers, he declared that “repugnant”
26 A ﬁnal report concerning the enactment of “Islamized” laws was to be submitted by the
CII within seven years after the promulgation of the Constitution (for autonomous action
on the part of the National and Provincial Assemblies within a further two years).
27 Persistent ambiguity surrounding the prime minister’s religion was addressed in the 18th
Amendment (2010), which stated that the prime minister must be a Muslim as well.
28 Within Article 260, pertaining to constitutional deﬁnitions, Clause 3 was added to note
that “a person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualiﬁed ﬁnality of the
Prophethood of Mohammad . . . is not a Muslim for the purposes of this Constitution
or law.” For earlier eﬀorts to introduce this provision, see Binder (1961: 272); Qasmi
(2014).
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laws should be sent back to the president (federal laws) or his appointed
governors (provincial laws) for amendment. (Appeals were then referred
to a special bench of the Supreme Court known as the Shariat Appellate
Bench. However, Zia nominated the judges who sat on that appellate
bench and ensured that any power to revise impugned laws would be
undertaken by his ownCII appointees in conjunction with the executive.)
Just one year later, however, in 1980, Zia revised this amendment.
In particular, he disbanded his provincial shariat courts to create, with
the help of an entirely new chapter in the Constitution (Chapter 3A),
a body known as the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) composed of a chair
(nominated by the president from amongst those eligible for appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court) and four members (again, nominated by the
president). This FSC is often viewed as an “apex” shari‘a court. But,
technically speaking, this court still sits within Pakistan’s ordinary judi-
cial hierarchy (with appeals traveling to the Shariat Appellate Bench of
Pakistan’s existing Supreme Court). Moreover, rather than allowing the
FSC to review of all shari‘a-oriented legislation, a special article (Article
203-B) was introduced to ensure that, once again, the FSC was not
empowered to review (a) the Constitution itself or (b) any “Muslim
personal law” (including, at least ostensibly, Ayub Khan’s Muslim
Family Laws Ordinance) (Tanzil-ur-Rahman 1996: 67–68).
Initially, the FSC was reluctant to embrace its new powers. In Kaikus
v. Federal Government (1981), for instance, the FSC held that it was not
able to judge matters like the permissibility of elections spelled out in the
Constitution itself. And, in Federation of Pakistan v.Mst. Farishta (1981),
dealing with inheritance, the court held that, with respect to Muslim
personal law, it was constrained by Article 203-B. In fact, even when the
court did exploit its jurisdiction, it embarrassed Zia. Its ﬁrst-ever judg-
ment (Mohammad Riaz v. Federal Government 1980), for instance,
regarding the enduring validity of the Indian Penal Code (1860) in
Pakistan, turned to Mohammad Iqbal in setting aside the inﬂuence of
the ulema: “While the opinions of the [classical] jurists are entitled to
some weight,” the FSC explained, those opinions “are not controlling”
(Collins 1988: 571). And, in Hazoor Bakhsh v. Federation of Pakistan
(1981), the court rejected the “traditional” view that stoning was an
acceptable Islamic punishment for adultery.29
29 Apparently, nationalist views inspired by Mohammad Iqbal, G.A. Parwez, and scholars
like Fazlur Rahman prevailed even within Zia’s (ostensibly Islamist) FSC (Brown 1996:
136–138).
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This decision, however, led Zia to reconsider the composition of the
court itself. Promulgating yet another constitutional amendment, Zia
added three ad hoc ulema to the court, while, at the same time, allowing
the court to review (and reverse) its own decisions (Collins 1988:
572–574).30 Apparently, judicial autonomy was not Zia’s intention; the
FSC was clearly intended to serve as a handmaiden of the executive.
Even after it was reconstituted to include representation from the
traditionalist ulema, however, Zia found the FSC hard to control.
In Habibur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan (1983), regarding Shi’i
participation in the hajj, for instance, the FSC noted that, where there
was no “state action” transforming an element of shari‘a into statute, there
was nothing for the court to strike down (or send back to the president and
his legislature for amendment).31 The FSC, in other words, continued to
insist that its role lay in deciding whether a state-based law was not Islamic
(rather thanwhat actuallywas).32 Indeed, even apart from the Constitution
and “Muslim personal law,” the FSC held that ostensibly “Islamic” laws
that failed to reﬂect a cross-sectarian consensus (as reﬂected in formal
legislation) could not be reviewed at all (Dr. Amanat Ali v. Federation of
Pakistan 1983; Redding 2004: 777, 783–784).
Frustration with Pakistan’s Federal Shariat Court – what Charles
Kennedy described as a certain “reluctance” on the part of the FSC
(and the Shariat Appellate Bench of Pakistan’s Supreme Court) “to
extend their jurisdiction through an activist interpretation of their con-
stitutional mandate” – ultimately prompted Zia to amend the
Constitution again (Kennedy 1992: 774). This time, he rejected the
“symbolic” status of the Objectives Resolution and elevated it to
a “substantive” provision of the Constitution itself: Article 2A (1985).
This article was speciﬁcally introduced to counter the case of Ziaur
Rahman (1973), according to which the judiciary had been prevented
from using the Constitution’s nonbinding preamble to strike down other
parts of the Constitution (Tanzil-ur-Rahman 1996: 57–63; Conrad 1997:
140–141). Zia hoped that, in formalizing Article 2A, he would ﬁnally
succeed in providing his courts with a measure of supra-constitutional
power – power through which Zia could reference Article 2A to strike
down elements of the Constitution he considered “disagreeable”
30 For Zia’s decision to add two handpicked ulema to the Shariat Appellate Bench, see
Tanzil-ur-Rahman (1996: 54); Redding (2004).
31 For additional examples, see Redding (2004: 778–782); Kennedy (1992: 773).
32 For an early statement of this purely negative approach (as articulated by the ulema), see
Binder (1961: 169).
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(Kennedy 1992: 780, 783–784, 786; Hakim Khan v. Government of
Pakistan 1992; Lau 2000: 58–62; Tanzil-ur-Rahman 1996: 69–83).33
Unfortunately, Zia found that his own courts were (still) quite reluc-
tant to support this cynical approach to Pakistan’s separation of powers
(Lau 2006: 59–65). InHakim Khan v.Government of Pakistan (1992) and
Kaneez Fatima v. Wali Mohammad (1993), for example, the Supreme
Court held that Article 2A could not be treated as a supra-constitutional
provision superseding the power of parliament (Lau 2006: 65–68).34
(In Kaneez Fatima, the Court noted that, although Article 2A could be
used to challenge an executive ordinance or regulation, it could not be
used to strike down ordinary parliamentary legislation.) Indeed, as
Charles Kennedy noted, this pattern of reluctance was not conﬁned to
the courts; there was also a clear sense of apprehension within the public
at large regarding “an expanded role for the superior courts via . . . supra-
constitutional [powers]” (Kennedy 1992: 786). Writing in 1992, Kennedy
believed that Article 2A would quickly expand the “religious” reach of the
courts. But, over time, the courts themselves indicated that Kennedy’s
concerns were overdrawn.35
Reviving “Islamization” (II): The Primacy of Parliamentary Power
Even as Zia’s push for Islamization was failing to inspire the courts,
however, Groups 1 and 3 reemerged to push Zia’s agenda forward within
the legislature itself. In 1985, for instance, traditionalist senators Sami-ul-
Haq and Qazi Abdul Latif (JUI) drafted a bill known as the Enforcement
of Shariah Bill to expand the reach of judicial review inmatters pertaining
to shari‘a (with “shari‘a” deﬁned in ways that highlighted the consensus
of Pakistan’s ulema) (Kennedy 1992: 775). And, shortly thereafter,
a group of Islamists aﬃliated with the Jama’at-e-Islami proposed
33 Note that Tanzil-ur-Rahman was at the forefront of this push to exploit the “Islamizing”
potential of Article 2A.
34 Note that even Tanzil-ur-Rahman was reluctant to usurp the power of the legislature
altogether (Lau 2006: 71, 73).
35 For a countervailing perspective, see Cheema (2012: 900–912). Cheema does not stress
the expanding reach of the FSC at the expense of Pakistan’s National or Provincial
Assemblies; he stresses the use of “religious reasoning” by superior court judges seeking
to bolster judgments, including judgments targeting unrestrained executive power,
within which the core argument is not primarily religious. Lau also describes cases in
which judges invoke religious principles in their interpretation of existing statutes,
including judgments that undermine basic rights (Lau 2006: 39–44, 70–73, 36–39,
112–119).
islamic law in an islamic republic 257
a Ninth Constitutional Amendment to revise Article 203-B (permitting
a review of Ayub Khan’s well-known MFLO).
Eventually, however, both the Enforcement of Shariat Bill and the
proposed Ninth Amendment failed to gather suﬃcient support in the
legislature. In the end both were defeated by nationalist politicians
(Group 2) aﬃliated with the Pakistan Muslim League and the
Pakistan People’s Party – nationalist politicians who balked at “reli-
gious” eﬀorts to shift legislative authority away from Pakistan’s
parliament.
Conclusion
This rather persistent defense of parliamentary power was ﬁnally dis-
rupted in 1988 when Zia stepped in to (a) dissolve the National Assembly
and (b) promulgate his own “Enforcement of Shariah” Ordinance. This
ordinance, however, was not introduced as a constitutional amendment;
it was introduced as a presidential ordinance. And, during the next four
months, when this ordinance was not ratiﬁed by any legislature (during
which time Zia was also killed in a mysterious plane crash), it simply
collapsed as expired.36
Finally, however, nearly 15 years after its creation, Pakistan’s FSC
stepped in to strike down a portion of the MFLO (Section 4) regarding
the inheritance of orphaned grandchildren (Allah Rakha v. Federation of
Pakistan 2000). In particular, the court built on the case ofKaneez Fatima
(1993) to annul the executive ordinance through which Ayub Khan
“created” a Qur’anic right of inheritance for these grandchildren.
Drawing attention to the absence of orphaned grandchildren in any
known scheme of Qur’anic heirs, however, the FSC refused to say what
the terms of Islamic inheritance regarding orphaned grandchildren
might be. Instead, drawing on the experience of Syria, Morocco, Egypt,
Iraq, and many other Muslim-majority countries, the court simply
turned to the work of the CII and referred the issue back to the
36 Following national elections in 1988, Zia’s ordinance was revived in the Senate before
advancing to the National Assembly under PrimeMinister Benazir Bhutto. Even before it
could be put up for a vote, however, the assembly itself was dissolved on the orders of Zia’s
presidential successor. Subsequent elections (1991) installed Nawaz Sharif as prime
minister. And, in due course, Sharif went on to introduce yet another Enforcement of
Shariah bill. This time, both the Senate and the National Assembly voted to pass the bill
(with every traditionalist and Islamist abstaining) – although, crucially, this new law
broke no new ground; it merely recognized existing habits vis-à-vis the interpretation of
statutory law in light of Islamic principles (Amjad Ali 1992; Lau 2006: 91–93).
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National Assembly for amendment.37 Again, the FSC stepped in to
declare what Islamic law was not; it did not intervene, in place of parlia-
ment, to deﬁne what that law should be.
“By 1977,”Martin Lau believes, “it was well established that Islamic law
imposed limits on the legislative power of the government” (Lau 2000: 66).
In fact “until the creation of the FSC [in 1980],” he notes, “the locus for any
introduction of Islamic law was parliament,” but thereafter he asserts that
the FSC became “an institutional mechanism to Islamize the legal system
independently” (Lau 2000: 45, 48; Lau 2006: 6).38 “In the absence of
political leadership or societal consensus,” Kennedy adds, “the real deter-
minant of the content . . . of Islamic reform has been the . . . courts
themselves.” “In the absence of [political] consensus,” he argues, “the
superior courts . . . adopt[ed] an increasingly activist stance” (Kennedy
1992: 787).39
Perhaps such claims are understandable given the lack of any robust
political consensus regarding the terms of Islamic law in Pakistan. But, in
a constitutional sense, I argue that these claims are also vastly overstated.
In fact, with respect to the Constitution, the locus of power vis-à-vis the
terms of Islamic law has not come to rest with the executive or the
judiciary. On the contrary, when it comes to Islamic law, the locus of
power has generally been vested in parliament. The courts have not
sought to claim autonomous power (despite the persistent hopes of
Groups 1 and 3 and the constitutional interventions of General Zia);
they have, instead, persistently stressed the preeminence of the legislature
(however lacking in “consensus” it might be).
In his reading of prevailing trends pertaining to the Objectives
Resolution, constitutional scholar Dieter Conrad reinforces this conclu-
sion, noting that, within the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the terms of
“Islam” were never thought to provide judges with any sort of supra-
constitutional power.With respect to divine authority, Conrad notes that
37 For an account of the superior court judgments leading up to “Allah Rakha,” see Lau
(2006: 138–139, 157–160).
38 Lau draws attention to what he calls a “judge-led process,” arguing that the FSC should be
understood as “an institutional mechanism to Islamize the legal system independently
from parliament” (Lau 2006: 9).
39 For one case in which this activist stance appeared to challenge a general deference to
legislative authority, see Cheema (2012: 892–896); here, a decision issued by the Shariat
Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court (Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hasan Khan 1989)
prompted a new Qisas and Diyat Ordinance – a rare case in which the shariat courts
actually seemed to prompt new legislation (1995) articulating what the terms of Islamic
law should be.
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“the direct recipient of [this] delegated authority is not . . . a monarchical
head of state but the people” (Conrad 1997: 128). Of course the degree to
which these “people”might take up this mantel of authority is variable (as
I have written elsewhere).40 But, with respect to Pakistan’s constitutional
jurisprudence, Conrad clearly notes that primacy lies with “the people.”
As Conrad points out, Pakistan’s ﬁrst Constituent Assembly (1952)
took a key decision regarding “the power of interpretation” vis-à-vis
shari‘a, and “this decision has remained the common basic structure
[for every] constitution” thereafter. “The power to . . . bring all legislation
in accordance with ‘the injunctions of Islam’,” he explains, “was vested in
parliament as the ﬁnal interpreting authority” (Conrad 1997: 133–134;
Omer 2012). “The general disposition” of the state was, thus, “to treat
Islamic principles as a matter [for] the future” and “to entrust their
realization to the . . . political responsibility of the legislature” (Conrad
1997: 135). Whereas Kennedy and Lau see a rising star for Pakistan’s
Islamic judiciary, in other words, I join Dieter Conrad in seeing
Pakistan’s judicial record as infused with the primacy of parliament.
This emphasis is fragile, but to my mind it is empirically unmistakable.
This chapter has traced the extent to which Pakistan came to embrace
a formula of eﬀective parliamentary preeminence in 1956, and the extent to
which, despite two superseding constitutional texts and several constitutional
amendments, this formula was not reversed. The original context within
which this balancewas struck – a context framed by debates about “Islam” as
the basis for holding East and West Pakistan together – was altered. But,
through periods of both civilian and military rule, as well as the loss of East
Pakistan, this balance has remained remarkably stable, taking shape in
a series of restorative amendments introduced by Ayub Khan in 1963.
Initially, constitutional provisions rendered speciﬁc references to
Islam nonbinding (in the Objectives Resolution), nonenforceable (in
the Directive Principles), or outside of the scope of routine judicial review
(with reference to the MFLO). Yet, even as these restrictive features
waxed and waned, the judiciary never fully or successfully challenged
the underlying principle of parliamentary preeminence in matters per-
taining to the statutory delineation of Islamic principles. While newer
institutions like the FSC subtly revised the institutional balance devel-
oped in 1956, the power to deﬁne Islamic law in a “positive” sense
continued to lie with parliament.
40 For an account of the political conditions under which parliamentary primacy vis-à-vis
the terms of Islamic law has been exercised in practice, see Nelson (2013).
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At ﬁrst glance, Pakistan has much in common with the framework of
religious “establishment” in countries like Israel. But, in the end,
Pakistan’s eﬀorts to limit the reach of traditional scholars and totalitarian
Islamists in favor of a written defense of parliamentarism – indeed,
Pakistan’s eﬀorts to ensure that, notwithstanding the “advice” of the
ulema, state-based religious laws are solely delineated within
a parliament subject to the power of the ballot – are very diﬀerent.
Democratic forms of constitutionalism need not be defeated by the
terms of religious establishment. In Pakistan, following Iqbal, the pro-
mise of democracy is closely tied to a nuanced combination of law and
religion ﬁltered through the work performed by an elected parliament.
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